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Introduction 
There is an abundance of literature on underdeveloped countries in which the 
emphasis is on capital shortage and surplus of labour as impediments to economic 
growth. The Arabian Gulf area, where surplus of capital and shortage of labour 
(manpower) are the main growth-restricting factors, represents an interesting 
contrast. 
The economic restructuring currently taking place on the Arabian Peninsula 
is forcing governments to take a hard look at their chronic dependence on foreign 
labour. With most economies hoping for consistent real growth in the 1990s, 
many analysts warn that the area's limited pool of technical and managerial staff 
could be the biggest single constraint to development[1]. 
Gulf States' reliance on foreign labour is well-established and apparently 
enduring. In mid-1985, almost three-quarters of the Gulf labour force, or 5.1 
million people, were foreign-born. Expatriates make up at least 50 per cent 
of the workforce in all Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. Economic 
planners are now starting to recognize that this dependence is likely to cause 
problems in the future. 
Despite the seriousness of the problem, little is known about the main factors 
responsible for the region's employment configurations. In particular, previous 
studies have not attempted to identify and quantify the determinants of the 
region's main employment patterns. The purpose of this article is to make an 
initial attempt at examining this issue. What are the main determinants of 
employment in the region? How do these determinants vary between national 
and foreign workforces? Have these determinants changed over time? 
Major Demographic Patterns 
In terms of size, Saudi Arabia's domestic labour force dominates the Gulf States 
(see Table I), with over 70 per cent of the total Gulf nationals. The next largest 
state is Oman with just over 15 per cent. In contrast, Bahrain accounts for 3.6 
per cent, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) just over 3 per cent, and Qatar for 
less than 1 per cent of the national populations of the Gulf States. 
To cast Gulf Populations in a regional context, the total national population 
of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states is about 11.3 million. This amounts 
to less than 25 per cent of Egypt's 46 million (1985 estimate) and fewer than 
one-third of Iran's 37 million people. This reality weighs heavily in the minds 
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of some Gulf country nationals and is a factor in population/manpower policies 
in GCC states, which are implicitly pro-nationalist. 
Low participation rates of nationals is one reason for the high dependence 
of the GCC states on foreign workers. In particular, women make up little more 
than 3 per cent of the workforce (Table II) in the region. Because children 
account for such a large proportion of GCC populations, the participation rate 
of nationals in the workforce averaged only 21.4 per cent in 1985. 
Table I. 
GCC: Number of 

















































































In Bahrain the proportion of Asians in the non-national workforce has always been 
particularly high. For example, the Bahrain census of March 1950 enumerated 
more than 3,000 Indians and Pakistanis, and they were by far the largest group 
of non-nationals employed by the island's main employer, the Bahrain Petroleum 
Company. In 1980, Asians accounted for some 88 per cent of all work permits 
issued in Bahrain, Indians alone making up more than 51 per cent. Arab immigrants 
received only 4 per cent of work permits issued in Bahrain, less than, for example, 
British nationals. During the early 1980s this trend continued: by 1984 (the latest 
year for which disaggregated figures are available), Asians were receiving 92 per 
cent of work permits issued. As Asians increased in absolute terms (by 65 per 
cent), the number of Arabs continued to fall. The number of work permits issued 






The pattern in Oman is similar. Asians, in particular Indians and Pakistanis, 
account for a very high proportion of non-national workers. Their share rose 
from 88 per cent in 1980 to 92 per cent in 1981 and 93 per cent in 1983. 
The proportion of non-national Arabs is much lower in the private sector than 
in the Civil Service, where they comprised 53 per cent (7,000) of all expatriates 
in 1980. In the private sector, Arabs accounted for only 2 per cent (2,300) of 
those holding work permits in 1980. While the share of Arabs holding labour 
cards fell even further (to only 1 per cent) over the period 1980-84, their share 
of Civil Service positions remained relatively stable. Egyptians represented an 
increasing proportion of non-national Arabs (rising from 60 per cent in 1980 
to 78 per cent in 1984) and accounted for much (57 per cent) of the total increase 
in non-national employment in the Civil Service. 
In contrast, the major increase in the private sector has been among Asian 
immigrant workers (showing an increase of 111 per cent since 1980). Although 
Indians and Pakistanis still dominate the Omani labour market, there has been 
a growing presence of Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Thai and Filipino workers. South 
Koreans first appeared in significant numbers in 1980, reaching a peak in 1981 
and subsequently declining. 
Qatar 
An increasing share of non-national Arabs in the Government sector is also 
the trend in Qatar, although only limited disaggregated data are available for 
the 1980-84 period. Arabs accounted for 29 per cent of non-national Government 
sector employment in Qatar (of which Egyptians, Jordanians and Palestinians 
represented 78 per cent). There were, however, almost as many Indians (7,600) 
as Arabs (7,900), and Asians represented 60 per cent of total employment. By 
1983, 53 per cent of non-national Government sector employees were Arabs, 
with Eyptians accounting for the bulk of the increase. There has been a sustained 
fall in the number of Asians (from 16,400 in 1980 to only 7,950 in 1983). In 
particular, the number of Iranians has fallen by over 300 per cent, although 
reductions have been noted among all Asian nationalities. 
Overall, in Qatar's Government sector, non-national employment fell from 
27,150 in 1980 to 17,650 in 1983 (a fall of 54 per cent). However, while the number 
of Asians fell by 51 per cent, the number of Arabs fell by 17 per cent). 
Saudi Arabia 
As noted above, Saudi Arabia has by far the largest percentage of nationals in 
its labour force. Demographic trends in the kingdom indicate that more than 
720,000 Saudi Arabians, representing almost 9 per cent of the population, will 
reach the age of 20 between 1988 and 1992 (see Table III). In the same time-
period, the total number of Saudis in the labour force is projected (see Table 
IV), to rise by just over 220,000. The shortfall is, of course, due to the fact 
it is projected that only 120,000 women, or about 6 per cent of Saudi women 
aged 15-60, will be working in 1992. 
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Saudi Arabia: National 
Population by Age, 






































































































































As a result of these demographic trends and the country's anticipated manpower 
requirements as its productive structure becomes more sophisticated, the 
foreign workforce will be increasingly crucial in filling certain specific 
occupations. For example, the country has traditionally relied on westerners 
as top managers. About 100,000 Europeans and North Americans are now 
employed in managerial and technical jobs[l]. However, this source may be 
endangered by the social trends taking place in advanced economies — between 
1992 and 1996 the number of young people entering the west European labour 





appropriately qualified people, particularly information technology specialists 
and service company managers. The net effect will be that Arabian companies 
will find it increasingly hard to hire European managerial and senior technical 
staff: 
Analysts forecast that, over the next few years, expatriate pay levels will increase in real 
terms as western skilled labor supply shrinks. The trend will be compounded by the weakness 
of Gulf currencies on foreign exchange markets[l, p. 3]. 
What is certain is that the private sector will have to step up efforts to develop 
the pool of nationals capable of running large, modern enterprises as employees 
rather than proprietors. 
Kuwait 
In the case of Kuwait, as well, an increasing share of new work permits is being 
issued to Asian immigrants. However, unlike Bahrain and Oman, that increase 
is from a much smaller base in the late 1970s. In 1977, for example, 47 per cent 
of the new work permits issued went to Arabs and 48 per cent to Asians. 
The share of Asians increased in 1978 to 59 per cent (Arabs 37 per cent), 
and by 1983 was over 60 per cent. In 1984, 81 per cent of new work permits 
went to Asian nationalities, and less than 15 per cent to Arabs (mainly Egyptians), 
a clear reflection of security concerns. Within this general pattern there are 
several noteworthy trends. The three main Asian nationalities in the late 1970s 
(Indians, Pakistanis and South Koreans) have all had their share reduced, while 
Bangladeshis and other Asians (in particular Thais, Filipinos and Sri Lankans) 
have increased rapidly. 
In summary, the decline in new labour inflows to Kuwait has been accompanied 
by a continuation of the trend towards increasing Asian share and within that 
Asian component there have also been significant changes. It is interesting to 
note that, in contrast with other Gulf countries, work permit renewals in Kuwait 
have increased during the 1980s. Analysis by nationality has shown that work 
permit renewals account for a very high and growing share of all work permits 
issued to Arabs; this ratio has increased from 49 per cent in 1976 to 66 per 
cent in 1981 (the last year for which renewal data were disaggregated by 
nationality). For some nationalities renewals account for a very high proportion 
of total work permits issued. 
Manpower Problems 
In summing up, the region's manpower problems stem from a combination of 
economic, social, and political factors, including[3]: 
(1) A predominance of expatriate labour. The rapid growth in the region's 
economies opened the door to employment opportunities. With this came 
a demand for labour that the native population was unable (or unwilling) 
to meet, leaving the majority of jobs in many sectors to be filled by 
expatriate labour. 
(2) The young age of the population. In general, half or nearly half of the 
region's populations are under 15 years of age. 
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(3) The high rate of illiteracy in the local populations. 
(4) The small part played by women in the regional labour forces. 
(5) The refusal of many workers to undertake any kind of manual work. 
Managerial, professional and government jobs are considered more 
prestigious. 
The large importation of foreign workers has raised a number of issues related 
to the Gulf States' manpower strategies: 
(1) Productive unemployment of nationals. A major issue is whether such 
a level of immigration is actually causing unemployment amongst the 
national population. It is possible that the large numbers of cheaply and 
easily available expatriates are slowing down the transfer of nationals 
from the traditional to the modern sector. Furthermore, nationals are 
becoming less inclined towards production and related occupations, which 
implies a continued heavy dependence on foreigners to fill such jobs. 
(2) Underdevelopment of human resources. A more profound aspect of the 
importation of so much labour by the Gulf countries has been the stunted 
development of their indigenous human resources. The widespread use 
of migrant labour combined with the high level of wealth, has led to a 
proliferation of luxury employment for nationals, which amounts to their 
withdrawal from the productive workforce. In fact, the educational system 
has become geared towards preparing nationals for this luxury 
employment rather than for productive employment. Thus migration has 
distorted the nature of development of human capital in the Gulf countries. 
Labour migration has led to native dependence on foreign manpower not 
only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. 
The open employment policy of Gulf country governments, coupled with a Civil 
Service system that minimizes competition and ignores an objective system 
of evaluation, has in all likelihood produced this low level of job commitment 
and low productivity. Continued dependence on imported labour may intensify 
this trend. More Government efforts towards the localization of the labour force 
have, in general, brought about a clear mismatch between the job requirements 
and the nationals available to fill them. Such a trend has resulted in low 
productivity of nationals who make up the labour force. 
A Framework for Analysis 
The factors outlined above are suggestive of a number of variables that affect 
employment patterns in the region in particular and the Arab world in general. 
In terms of those variables that can be easily quantified, we have selected six 
main factors that are likely to influence the differential rates of job creation: 
(1) The growth in income. Up to a point, increased rates of economic 
expansion are conducive to accelerated demands for workers of all types. 
However, whenever this expansion outstrips the ability of the local 





becomes a necessary element in sustaining growth. In terms of variables 
depicting this effect, both changes in the level of real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and non-oil GDP (YNO) were used. At full employment, 
the ability of an economy to generate new jobs is obviously limited. To 
determine the effect of capacity limitations on job creation, an additional 
variable, the rate of inflation (INF) was introduced. 
(2) Educational expenditures. Literacy is a good indicator of the degree of 
development in a country. In the Arabian Gulf states, the literacy rate 
was, until quite recently, very low. For example, the industrialized 
countries have generally achieved literacy rates in the range of 97-98 per 
cent of their populations. As of 1980, Kuwait's 68.1 per cent was the 
highest in the Gulf region. This was followed by UAE at 66.3, Qatar 59.2, 
Bahrain 49.9, while Oman had only 38.3, followed by Saudi Arabia at 
33.5[4]. The drive to increase literacy in the region has resulted in 
withdrawals from the labour force of workers who would ordinarily be 
actively employed. The change in educational expenditures (ED) was 
used to proxy this effect on employment. 
(3) Population growth. Everything else being equal, the countries with higher 
proportional rates of population growth (POP) should be able to take 
advantage of expanding employment opportunities, thus experiencing 
expansion in job creation. However, given the increasing sophistication 
of many jobs in the region, the rate of hirings may be sensitive not only 
to the number of new entrants into the labour force, but also to the 
number of literate entrants. To examine this possibility, the increase in 
the literate population (LRP) was also included as an independent variable 
in the regression analysis. 
(4) Labour force participation rate. The crude economic activity rates of the 
Gulf States are low compared with the industrialized countries. Four 
countries do not exceed 40 per cent of crude economic activity rates: 
Saudi Arabia 25.7 per cent, Kuwait 32.9 per cent, Oman 30.8 per cent 
and Bahrain 34.5 per cent; while in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
they are 53.3 per cent and 54.7 per cent respectively. In the industrialized 
countries, the crude economic activity rates exceed 60 per cent [5]. These 
rates have increased in recent years largely owing to the expansion in 
the Government sector jobs, together with increased participation by 
females in several of the Gulf States. As these rates continue to increase, 
there may be a fairly large surge in the domestic workforce. 
(5) The military participation effect. As noted, expanded government 
expenditures have resulted in increased rates of labour force participation 
in the Gulf States. This effect has been particularly significant in the 
area of defence forces. The rapid expansion in allocations to the military 
has been well documented. Less well known is the corresponding increase 
in manpower requirements created by these expenditures [6]. The region's 
stepped-up rate of defence expenditures has several implications for the 
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overall increase in employment: (1) the rate of job creation is higher than 
would have ordinarily been the case, since expansion of the armed forces 
is not dependent on a corresponding increase in indigenous economic 
activity, and (2) the need for foreign workers will be greater owing to 
the vacancies created in the labour market by younger men opting for 
the military. These effects are tested for by introducing the increase in 
armed forces (AF) and the military participation (AFP) rate (military 
personnel per 1,000 population) into the regression equations. 
(6) The oil effect. This effect is intended to capture the significant surge in 
construction activity and related increases in employed associated with 
increased (post-1973) growth in the Gulf States. All things being equal, 
this effect should result in more employment (and certainly foreign 
workers) per unit of income increase than is likely to be the the case 
in countries not in a position to import massive amounts of equipment 
and workers. It is this construction activity that was resonsible for the 
rapid increase in expatriate labour in the 1970s (and their almost equally 
rapid departure in the post-1982 era of declining oil prices). This variable 
was proxied by multiplying an oil dummy variable, with values of 1 for 
the major oil-exporting countries, and 0 for the other Arab countries, 
times the change in income. 
The estimated[7] equations, with expected signs ( ), are of the form: 
Total employment (TEMP) and employment of nationals (DEMP) = 
Income (YNO, GDP) (+), Inflation (INF) (?), 
Education (ED) (-) , 
Population (POP, LRT) (+), 
Labour force participation rate (LPR) (+), 
Armed forces/military participation rate (+), 
Oil effect (DYNO, DGDP) (+). 
Employment of foreigners (FEMP) = 
Income (YNO, GDP) (+), Inflation (INF) (?) 
Education (ED) (+) 
Population (POP, LRT) (-) 
Labour participation rate (LPR) (-) 
Armed forces military participation rate (+), 
Oil effect (DYNO, DGDP) (+) 
where: 
TEMP = total employment 
DEMP = employment of nationals 
FEMP = employment of foreign workers 
YNO = non-oil GDP 
DYNO = Dummy variable formed by multiplying OIL (major oil producers 





GDP = Gross domestic product 
DGDP = Dummy variable formed by multiplying OIL (major 
oil producers = 1, others = 0) times GDP 
ED = public sector expenditures on education 
POP = total population 
LRP = literate population 
LPR = labour participation rate 
AF = armed forces 
AFP = military participation rate (soldiers per 1,000 population). 
All figures are in terms of change over the period under review (except education 
where best results were obtained by lagging one year). 
Results 
The results[8] of this analysis (Tables V-X) produced several interesting results. 
The most significant of these for the period (1975-85) as a whole (Tables V 
and VI) was the finding that: 
(1) The expansion in total employment (nationals plus foreigners) has been 
largely a function of expansion of both economic activity and increases 
in population. Interestingly enough, total population increase (POP) was 
considerably more important in this regard than the expansion of the 
literate (LRP) population — equation (1) (Tables V and VI). 
(2) In the basic equation — equation (1) (Tables V and VI), changes in income 
appear (as evidenced by the size of the standardized regression equations) 
to be approximately twice as strong as population and educational 
expenditures in affecting total employment. However, with the introduction 
of oil and inflation into the regression equation, increases in income fall 
to about one half of the strength population increase in affecting 
movements in total employment. 
(3) Increased educational expenditures seem to have resulted in a slow-down 
in total employment and in the employment of nationals (with a 
corresponding increase in the employment of foreign workers). However, 
judging from the size of the standardized coefficient, this effect may have 
been fairly weak. In addition, the size of the coefficient for the education 
variable (ED) is unstable to the extent that this variable would be of limited 
use in forecasting likely levels of future employment. 
(4) The coefficient of the labour participation rate (LPR) has been fairly stable 
for both total and domestic employment. It appears that increasing labour 
force participation has been a fairly strong, but not dominant, factor in 
increasing overall employment. 
(5) Statistically, the inflation term (INF) was also quite significant in both 
the total and national (but not foreign) labour force employment equations. 
If the inflation term had been positive in the labour force equations, we 
could conclude fairly safely that we were observing the inability of our 
sample countries to attract additional national workers into the labour 
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Employment in the 
Arab World: Expansion 
in Non-oil GDP, 
1975-85 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Total employment 
(1) TEMP = 0.98 YNO - 0.60 ED + 0.52 POP - 0.45 LRP 
(2.43) (-1.87) (2.52) (-1.08) 
(2) TEMP = 0.59 YNO - 0.27 ED + 0.61 POP + 0.28 LRP 
(2.24) (-1.14) (3.50) (1.91) 
r2 = 0.867; F = 10.78; df = 15 
(3) TEMP = 0.42 YNO - 0.83 ED + 0.97 POP + 0.23 LPR 
(2.74) (-2.88) (7.76) (2.76) 
+ 0.51 DYNO - 0.45 INF 
(2.07) (-4.86) r2 = 0.948; F = 27.33; df = 15 
Employment of nationals 
(4) DEMP = 0.81 YNO - 0.74 ED + 0.75 POP - 0.27 LRP 
(1.87) (-2.15) (2.22) (-0.61) 
r2 = 0.719; F = 7.02; df = 15 
(5) DEMP = 0.54 YNO - 0.49 ED + 0.68 POP + 0.30 LPR 
(1.98) (-2.02) (3.79) (1.96) 
r2 = 0.784; F = 9.99; df = 15 
(6) DEMP = 0.32 YNO - 0.62 ED + 0.98 POP + 0.23 LPR 
(2.03) (-2.11) (7.64) (2.70) 
+ 0.09 DYNO - 0.49 INF 
(0.37) (-5.23) r2 = 0.947; F = 26.58; df = 15 
Employment of foreigners 
(6) FEMP = 0.44 YNO + 0.61 ED - 0.54 LRP - 0.01 LPR + 0.31 AFP 
(1.23) (2.10) (-2.44) (-0.09) (1.80) 
r2 = 0.832; F = 9.89; df = 15 
(7) FEMP = 0.23 YNO - 0.55 ED + 0.06 LRP + 0.07 LPR 
(0.87) (1.32) (0.24) (0.64) 
+ 0.14 AFP + 1.31 DYNO 
(1.10) (3.23) r2 = 0.778; F = 9.60; df = 15 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols, r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F st: 
df = degrees of freedom; and ( ) = t-test for significance. All variables are in 
of changes over the 1975-85 period (except education, which is for 1974-84). 
force during periods of or close to full employment. Unde 
circumstances, the spill-over into foreign labour markets would be 
means of compensating for labour shortages during boom years, 
the strong negative sign on the inflation term suggests (bi 
conclusive evidence of the fact) that inflation may divert investmi 
into speculative rather than capacity-creating activities. 
(6) The oil effect (DYNO, DGDP) appears to have been fairly imp 







Employment in the 
Arab World: Expansion 
in Gross Domestic 
Product, 1975-85 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Total employment 
(1) TEMP = 0.87 GDP - 0.46 ED + 0.78 POP - 0.LRP 
(2.72) (-1.89) (2.75) (-1.22) 
r2 = 0.757; F = 10.10; df = 17 
(2) TEMP = 0.52 GDP - 0.19 ED + 0.62 POP + 0.29 LPR 
(2.35) (-0.96) (3.74) (2.11) 
r2 = 0.797; F = 12.83; df = 17 
(3) TEMP = 0.32 GDP - 0.21 ED + 0.85 POP + 0.25 LPR - 0.40 INF 
(1.95) (-1.59) (6.54) (2.60) (-3.83) 
r2 = 0.909; F = 24.01; df = 17 
Employment of nationals 
(4) DEMP = 0.72 GDP - 0.62 ED + 0.75 POP - 0.27 LRP 
(2.07) (-2.36) (2.42) (-0.69) 
r2 = 0.715; F = 8.15; df = 17 
(5) DEMP = 0.47 GDP - 0.41 ED + 0.70 POP + 0.30 LPR 
(2.01) (-2.01) (4.05) (2.14) 
r2 = 0.781; F = 11.60; df = 17 
(6) DEMP = 0.14 GDP - 0.44 ED + 0.97 POP + 0.26 LPR - 0.47 INF 
(1.59) (3.67) (8.24) (3.05) (-5.03) 
r2 = 0.930; F = 31.65; df = 17 
Employment of foreigners 
(6) FEMP = 0.40 GDP - 0.24 ED - 0.12 POP + 0.01 LPR + 0.92 DGNP 
(2.56) (-1.01) (-0.93) (0.20) (4.32) 
r2 = 0.910; F = 24.29; df = 17 
(7) FEMP = 0.24 GNP - 0.16 ED - 0.10 POP + 0.01 LPR + 0.97 DGNP 
(1.74) (-0.74) (-0.82) (0.11) (4.99) 
+0.19 AFP r2 = 0.934; F = 25.81; df = 17 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols. r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; 
df = degrees of freedom; and ( ) = t-test for significance. All variables are in terms 
of changes over the 1975-85 period (except education, which is for 1974-84). 
As might have been imagined, the oil effect was extremely significant 
(equation (7), Tables V and VI) in explaining movements in the foreign 
workforce. The foreign force was also more affected (negatively) by 
movements in the literate, as opposed to total national, labour force. 
However, this factor was minor, relative to the oil effect. 
(7) Movements in the numbers of soldiers in the armed forces do not appear 
to have placed a particular strain on labour markets in the sample countries 
— this term (either the military participation rate (AFP), or the increase 
in armed forces (AF)) was insignificant in both the total and national 
employment equations. However, there is some evidence (equation (7), 
Table VI) that increases in the military participation rate may have spilled 
over into the need to import additional foreign workers. If present, this 
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Employment in the 
Arab World: Expansion 
in Non-oil GDP, 
1975-80 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Total employment 
(1) TEMP = 1.05 YNO - 0.54 ED - 0.34 POP + 0.87 LRP 
(2.25) (-1.20) (-1.40) (3.69) 
r2 = 0.829; F = 13.34; df = 15 
(2) TEMP = 0.88 YNO - 0.43 ED + 0.61 LRP + 0.33 LPR 
(2.69) (-1.36) (5.75) (3.68) 
r2 = 0.910; F = 27.57; df = 15 
(3) TEMP = 0.15 YNO - 0.15 ED + 0.78 LRP + 0.34 LPR 
(0.39) (-0.45) (7.97) (4.84) 
+ 0.47 DYNO + 0.26 AF 
(2.85) (2.31) r2 = 0.956; F = 32.89; df = 15 
Employment of nationals 
(4) DEMP = 0.86 YNO - 0.59 ED - 0.31 POP + 0.99 LRP 
(2.21) (-1.58) (-1.51) (5.00) 
r2 = 0.879; F = 19.95; df = 15 
(5) DEMP = 0.72 YNO - 0.51 ED + 0.76 LRP + 0.18 LPR 
(1.97) (-1.42) (6.32) (1.78) 
r2 = 0.887; F = 21.49; df = 15 
(6) DEMP = -0.15 YNO + 0.20 ED + 0.84 LRP + 0.20 LPR 
(-0.12) (0.51) (8.03) (2.42) 
+ 0.11 DYNO + 0.35 AF 
(0.57) (2.47) r2 = 0.934; F = 21.07; df = 15 
Employment of foreigners 
(7) FEMP = 0.86 YNO - 0.10 ED - 0.37 LRP + 0.48 LPR 
(1.75) (-0.20) (-2.32) (3.55) 
r2 = 0.798; F = 10.89; df = 15 
(8) FEMP = 1.00 YNO - 0.89 ED - 0.19 LRP + 0.46 LPR 
(2.58) (-2.56) (-1.99) (6.51) 
+ 0.77 DYNO - 0.11 AF r2 = 0.957; F = 33.04; df = 15 
(4.68) (-0.11) 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols. r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; 
df = degrees of freedom; and ( ) = t-test for significance. All variables are in terms 
of changes over the 1975-80 period (except education, which is for 1974-79). 
effect would be fairly weak. Its presence was found only in the equatio 
for total income (Table VI), not in the equations using non-oil incom 
In sum, analysis for the period as a whole produced a fairly consistent set 
results. Economic factors alone appear to have accounted for well over 90 p 
cent of the fluctuation in both total domestic and national rates of employme 
Similar results, both in terms of the standard statistical tests and the size 
the regression coefficient, were obtained using either total Gross Domes 







Employment in the 
Arab World: Expansion 
in Gross Domestic 
Product, 1975-80 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Total employment 
(1) TEMP = 0.88 GDP - 0.36 ED - 0.21 POP + 0.87 LRP 
(3.33) (-1.37) (-0.95) (4.11) 
r2 = 0.844; F = 16.20; df = 16 
(2) TEMP = 0.74 GDP - 0.26 ED + 0.72 LRP + 0.32 LPR 
(4.17) (-1.51) (9.42) (4.15) 
r2 = 0.931; F = 40.47; df = 16 
(3) TEMP = -0.04 GDP + 0.01 ED + 0.80 LRP + 0.36 LPR 
(-0.07) (0.05) (8.59) (4.41) 
+ 0.49 DGDP + 0.32 AF r2 = 0.944; F = 28.32; df = 16 
(1.55) (1.41) 
Employment of nationals 
(4) DEMP = 0.62 GDP - 0.40 ED + 0.83 LRP 
(2.49) (-1.59) (7.59) 
r2 = 0.845; F = 23.57; df = 16 
(6) DEMP = 0.56 GNP - 0.33 ED + 0.84 LRP + 0.18 LPR 
(2.35) (-1.39) (8.24) (1.77) 
r2 = 0.876; F = 21.37; df = 16 
(7) DEMP = 0.08 GNP + 0.10 ED + 0.79 LRP + 0.23 LPR + 0.29 AF 
(0.25) (0.34) (8.39) (2.45) (2.09) 
r2 = 0.912; F = 22.74; df = 16 
Employment of foreigners 
(8) FEMP = 0.71 GNP + 0.06 ED - 0.25 LRP + 0.43 LPR 
(2.66) (0.22) (-2.19) (3.74) 
r2 = 0.841; F = 15.91; df = 16 
(9) FEMP = 1.55 GNP - 0.69 ED - 0.15 LRP + 0.35 LPR - 0.50 AF 
(6.59) (-3.11) (-2.17) (4.97) (-4.82) 
r2 = 0.949; F = 41.00; df = 16 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols, r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; 
df = degrees of freedom; and ( ) = t-test for significance. All variables are in terms 
of changes over the 1975-80 period (except education, which is for 1974-79). 
reflect the continued dependence of non-oil income on Arab countries on 
developments in the oil sector — non-oil GDP does not have a growth potential 
independent of financial infusions from the oil sector. 
In order to gain some idea of the stability over time of these relationships, 
similar exercises were undertaken for the two five-year subperiods, 1975-80 
and 1980-85. With regard to the earlier period (Table VII and VIII) several 
important differences relative to the period as a whole were found: 
(1) The major difference involves the importance of literate, as opposed to 
total population, in the total and national employment equations. Put 
differently, increases in employment in this earlier period were largely 
a function of increases in the literate population, rather than the overall 
increase in population, a characteristic found for the period as a whole. 
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Employment in the 
Arab World: Expansion 
in Non-oil GDP, 
1980-85 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Total employment 
(1) TEMP = 0.50 YNO - 0.22 ED + 0.60 POP - 0.29 LRP 
(1.94) (-1.18) (2.62) (-1.44) 
r2 = 0.673; F = 5.66; df = 15 
(2) TEMP = 0.31 YNO - 0.10 ED + 0.60 POP + 0.44 LPR 
(1.63) (-0.64) (3.39) (3.18) 
T2 = 0.798; F = 10.84; df = 15 
(3) TEMP = 0.05 YNO - 0.59 ED + 1.16 POP + 0.40 LPR 
(-0.37) (-2.07) (6.10) (4.15) 
+ 0.44 DYNO - 0.49 INF 
(1.57) (-4.06) r2 = 0.930; F = 20.02; df = 15 
Employment of nationals 
(4) DEMP = 0.41 YNO - 0.41 ED + 0.74 POP - 0.37 LRP 
(1.87) (-2.46) (2.14) (3.79) 
r2 = 0.760; F = 8.70; df = 15 
(5) DEMP = 0.22 YNO - 0.30 ED + 0.70 POP + 0.27 LPR 
(1.00) (-1.71) (3.43) (1.70) 
r2 = 0.730; F = 7.45; df = 15 
(6) DEMP = 0.11 YNO - 0.27 ED + 1.14 POP + 0.32 LPR 
(-0.71) (-0.93) (5.91) (3.20) 
- 0.14 DYNO - 0.58 INF 
(-0.48) (-4.76) r2 = 0.928; F = 25.11; df = 15 
Employment of foreigners 
(7) FEMP = 0.07 YNO + 0.48 ED + 0.27 LRP + 0.62 LPR 
(0.27) (2.20) (1.21) (3.12) 
r2 = 0.599; F = 4.10; df = 15 
(8) FEMP = 0.16 YNO - 0.47 ED + 0.20 LRP + 0.44 LPR 
(0.72) (-1.03) (2.35) (2.26) 
+ 0.98 DYNO - 0.02 INF 
(2.26) (0.09) r2 = 0.755; F = 4.63; df = 15 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols. r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; 
df = degrees of freedom; and ( ) = t-test for significance. All variables are in terms 
of changes over the 1975-80 period (except education, which is for 1974-79). 
(2) In addition, during the earlier period, expanded rates of employment 
were more closely associated with increases in the labour participation 
rate than had been the case for the entire period. 
(3) Expansion of the armed forces was a fairly important source of 
employment during the 1975-80 period, but again not for the entire ten 







Employment in the 
Arab World: Expansion 
in Gross Domestic 
Product, 1980-85 
(Standardized regression coefficients) 
Total employment 
(1) TEMP = 0.43 GDP + 0.08 ED + 0.62 POP - 0.09 LRP 
(0.80) (0.29) (1.94) (-0.37) 
r2 = 0.583; F = 4.20; df = 16 
(2) TEMP = 0.03 GDP + 0.02 ED + 0.76 POP + 0.45 LPR 
(0.14) (0.10) (3.52) (2.86) 
r2 = 0.750; F = 8.97; df = 16 
(3) TEMP = -0.11 GDP - 0.39 ED + 1.12 POP + 0.56 LPR 
(-0.60) (-1.93) (7.26) (4.80) 
- 0.18 DGDP - 0.49 INF 
(-0.65) (-4.35) r2 = 0.926; F = 20.86; df = 16 
Employment of nationals 
(4) DEMP = 0.20 GDP - 0.16 ED + 0.78 POP - 0.20 LRP 
(0.72) (-0.69) (2.81) (-1.05) 
r2 = 0.700; F = 6.89; df = 16 
(5) DEMP = 0.18 GDP - 0.13 ED + 0.71 POP + 0.24 LPR 
(0.68) (-0.61) (3.13) (1.44) 
r2 = 0.717; F = 7.61; df = 16 
(6) DEMP = -0.11 GDP - 0.43 ED + 1.14 POP + 0.27 LPR 
(-0.53) (-2.05) (7.07) (2.35) 
+ 0.08 DGDP - 0.56 INF 
(0.27) (-4.80) r2 = 0.919; F = 18.96; df = 16 
Employment of foreigners 
(7) FEMP = -0.19 GDP + 0.43 ED + 0.30 LRP + 0.66 LPR 
(-0.91) (2.11) (1.69) (3.54) 
r2 = 0.620; F = 4.89; df = 16 
(8) FEMP = 0.03 GDP + 0.06 ED + 0.32 LPR + 0.81 LRP 
(-0.78) (1.90) (1.79) (3.44) 
+ 0.57 DGNP - 0.08 INF 
(-1.00) (-0.40) r2 = 0.669; F = 3.37; df = 16 
Notes: See text for definition of symbols, r2 = coefficient of determination; F = F statistic; 
df = degrees of freedom; and ( ) = t-est for significance. All variables are in terms 
of changes over the 1975-80 period (except education, which is for 1974-79). 
(4) In contrast with the entire period, the foreign labour force increased 
in line with increases in the labour participation rate (but not increases 
in the numbers of literate population). This pattern undoubtedly reflects 
the expanded employment opportunities (and hence increased labour 
participation rate of the literate national workforce) associated with 
increases in Government hirings financed by stepped-up oil revenues. 
During this period foreign workers undoubtedly assumed many of the 
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lower scale manual jobs, where the literate population was not increasing 
in line with demand. 
For the latter (1980-85) period, several additional differences were found (Tables 
IX and X): 
(1) In general, most of the estimated equations accounted for a much lower 
percentage of movements in employment than had been the case in the 
two previous sets of analysis. 
(2) More importantly, increases in income had lost most of their employment-
generating effects. This was the case for all categories of workers — 
total, national and foreign. 
(3) During this recent period, increases in employment were largely a function 
of expanded rates of population growth, as opposed to increases in the 
literate population. 
(4) Again in contrast with the earlier period, inflation had a fairly significant 
(and negative) impact on total and national (but not foreigner) rates of 
employment. 
(5) Expansion in the foreign workforce, however, was still largely a function 
of increases in the literate population and in the labour participation rate. 
This latter fact is consistent with the well-known practice (especially in 
the Gulf States) of excessive hiring of nationals by governments. This 
leaves a vacuum in many areas that must continue to be filled by foreign 
workers. 
Conclusions 
The employment patterns of the 1980-85 period are suggestive of, but do not 
provide conclusive proof of, a general decline in worker productivity. This decline 
is evidenced primarily by the lack of a strong link between increases in 
employment and corresponding increases in output. In part, this phenomenon 
reflects the excessive retention of workers by many governments and firms 
in the oil-exporting countries during a period of declining revenues. The severing 
of the link between employment and expansion of the literate population also 
may be indicative of a general decline in overall worker productivity during this 
period. 
The results obtained above, particularly for the 1980-85 period, suggest that 
labour market mismatches may be increasing in the Arab World. This is 
essentially the problem of too many PhDs and too few mechanics. The symptom 
of this would be relatively high levels of disguised unemployment among the 
highly educated, coupled with a shortage of artisans. The damage arising from 
these skill mismatches lies in the way the various economic sectors are likely 
to expand while faced by labour constraints. 
Two elements of the change in Government behaviour may provide a 
transmission mechanism for skill mismatches: 
(1) There has been very rapid decision making involving education. This 





in a very rapid expansion in the tertiary education sector (including 
sending students abroad) with only limited consideration for the primary 
and secondary sectors, together with a neglect of technical education. 
In effect, education policy has developed as a by-product of spending 
decisions rather than as a result of any carefully laid-out education policy. 
(2) Once the mismatches appear, governments have been willing (via revenue 
access) to absorb them in employment policies — over development of 
bureaucracy to provide employment for nationals returning from education 
abroad who would otherwise be employed below their desired status. 
The willingness to absorb the skill mismatches thus tends to disguise 
the appearance of signals warning against the development of even greater 
mismatches. 
What is suggested here, especially for the Gulf States, is that reforms of both 
the educational system and of hiring practices of Government agencies will be 
critical to restoring increases in productivity and ultimately expanded rates of 
non-oil income. 
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